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I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
This article explores the significance of emerging multidisciplinary 
theories about brain function that dictate profound reassessment of 
basic lawyering assumptions about human behavior.  These emerging 
theories indicate that, as human beings, our perceptions and 
memories are flawed, and as a result, lawyers work with distorted 
information that influences our thinking.1  This article describes how 
the brain functions to create these distortions, how this affects law 
practice, and how we can teach students to compensate for these 
deficiencies in thinking.2
Several universal and unconscious dimensions to human behavior 
or brain function significantly affect the lawyer’s conscious decisions 
and actions.  New substantial knowledge about how the brain works 
as well as significant scientific attention to the biological basis of the 
human capacity for perception and decision-making exists
  I argue that these premises should be 
integrated into the teaching of law and lawyering to law students. 
3
 
 1. See discussion infra Parts II.A–B, II.D. 
 that 
 2. This article does not address the emerging substantive legal issues that both law 
professors and neuroscientists are actively producing critical literature on matters 
including ethics, privacy, and evidentiary issues such as lie detection.  See, e.g., Henry 
T. Greely, Knowing Sin: Making Sure Good Science Doesn’t Go Bad, in CEREBRUM 
2007: EMERGING IDEAS IN BRAIN SCIENCE 85, 90–91 (Cynthia A. Read, ed., 2007) 
(discussing ethical issues in contemporary neuroscience concerning new 
developments being used beyond their intended uses or being used without scientific 
justification, the primary ethical concern is the use of neuroscience in lie detection); 
Adam J. Kolber, Therapeutic Forgetting: The Legal and Ethical Implications of 
Memory Dampening, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1561 (2006) (discussing whether access to 
memory dampening drugs should be allowed, prohibited, or severely restricted); Stacy 
A. Tovino, Functional Neuroimaging Information: A Case for Neuro 
Exceptionalism?, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 415 (2007) (discussing neuroethics and the 
confidentiality, privacy, and identity implications of advances in functional magnetic 
resonance imaging).  These studies document debate about the implications of 
neuroscience on the future development of doctrine in areas such as constitutional 
law, criminal law, and ethics.  Instead, my attention is on how we can implement 
more conscious problem-solving skills in the application of law and what the 
implications are of doing so. 
 3. Although I reference biological capacity, I do not dismiss the common scientific 
understanding that human reasoning processes are an intricate association between the 
biological basis and social interaction—this association is so tight that the relationship 
cannot be disassociated.  See, e.g., Antonio Damasio, The Neural Basis of Social 
Behavior: Ethical Implications, in DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE: 
ESSENTIAL READINGS IN NEUROETHICS 175, 175–76 (Walter Glannon, Ph.D., ed., 
2007) [hereinafter DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE].  However, this 
acknowledgment does not lessen the imperative to understand how the biological 
function operates in order to dispel outmoded and incorrect assumptions that lawyers 
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explains biological bases underlying human behavior.  This article 
explores how this knowledge about brain functioning enables law 
students to perform more effectively as they acquire the range of 
lawyering skills including the fundamentals of fact investigation, fact 
analysis, and problem solving in their law school curricula.4
In section II, I explore the following specific premises of brain 
function that affect law practice: (1) we automatically think we know 
more than we do; (2) what we believe to be objectively true is not 
necessarily so; (3) the objects we perceive are not necessarily as they 
appear to be; (4) accurate memory recall is a falsehood; and (5) we 
have a structure for creating and storing memory that narrows what 
we are able to remember through a process using categorization and 
metaphor.  I also illustrate how these premises interfere with the clear 
thinking lawyers need. 
 
 
make about themselves and others—that is, about human behavior.  For instance, see 
Damasio’s discussion of bioregulation as edifice for each individual’s neural system 
interacting with the social collective that produces ethical behaviors.  Id. at 176.  
People are responsible for their actions, their brains are not.  MICHAEL GAZZANIGA, 
THE ETHICAL BRAIN, 87–102 (2005).  I do not discuss the issue of free will since this 
reasoning is scientifically accepted, sound, and already intellectually rehashed.   Nor 
do I address the basic issue of intentionality in that even though we may not 
understand the causes of our behavior, humans, nevertheless, act intentionally and 
consciously.  The individual is capable of minimal rational reality because of the 
brain, and that rationality allows for intentionality.  See Stephen J. Morse, New 
Neuroscience, Old Problems: Legal Implications of Brain Science, 6 CEREBRUM 81, 
81–90 (2004), reprinted in DEFINING RIGHT AND WRONG IN BRAIN SCIENCE, supra, at 
197. 
 4. Paying attention to human behavior does not diminish the reality that individual 
human character is a result of many factors other than internal brain function.  
Character evolves from the complex development of individual intention and social 
interaction.  See Damasio, supra note 3, at 175; Morse, supra note 3, at 202.  By 
“character” I mean the deliberate adoption of values and beliefs that drive conscious 
choices and that constitute one’s orientation to external reality.  However, core legal 
doctrine and lawyering are taught with no more than passing, and often inaccurate, 
references to the underlying knowledge of brain function and human behavior.  I use 
the term “brain science” to reference the multidisciplinary study of human behavior 
including neuroscience, which includes both neuro-pyschology and cognitive 
psychology, since there is enormous flow and mutual reliance between these fields as 
well as among other disciplines such as linguistics, philosophy, neuro-anatomy,  
neuro-chemistry, and neuro-economics or behavioral decision theory.  Some 
neuroscience is also called “neuro-ethics,” which is defined as the “study of the 
ethical, legal, and social questions that arise when scientific findings about the brain 
are carried into medical practice, legal interpretations, and health and social policy.”  
This term is attributed to William Safire.  See Ruth Fischbach & Gerald Fischbach, 
Foreword to SANDRA J. ACKERMAN, HARD SCIENCE, HARD CHOICES: FACTS, ETHICS, 
AND POLICIES GUIDING BRAIN SCIENCE TODAY, at x–xi (2006). 
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In section III, I propose a systematic framework of internal 
monitoring called “Intentionality” as a method for lessening the 
distortions created by our brains.  I advocate that law schools teach 
students how their brains function to distort information and how 
they can use this Intentionality framework to gain self-awareness to 
compensate for this distortion and lessen the adverse effects of our 
default assumptions about the functioning of our mental processes. 
The Intentionality framework involves a three-step process.5  This 
framework is one of attention that is controlled from the inside.  One 
way to tear down erroneous mental preconceptions is to pay attention 
to the “small thoughts” within us that preface our external reactions.6  
The framework is a repetitive cycle of internal intention to external 
attention; external attention to action; and action to reflection.7  Once 
mastered, the cycle becomes more nuanced and recursive.  To begin 
adoption, the process is deliberate and conscious but as the individual 
successfully practices Intentionality, the process becomes habitual 
and highly adaptive.8
In section IV, I explore ways to teach the Intentionality framework 
in both classroom dialogue as well as in lawyering or clinical 
supervision.
  My key premise is that following the cycle of 
this framework and focusing on these premises about human 
behavior leads to improved understanding of external circumstances, 
better recognition of the issues to be solved, and greater capacity to 
effectively respond to the problem. 
9
All three major reports on the state of legal education in the United 
States over the past two decades indentify the need to teach law or 
lawyering within a reality-based context as well as embedding greater 
metacognitive reflection capacity in the law student.
  Students can apply this framework to incorporate 
Intentionality into their broader legal problem-solving analysis.  
Using their knowledge of brain functioning, students can explore how 




 5. See discussion infra Part III. 
  Over the past 
 6. See infra Part III.A (discussing Stage 1 of the Intentionality framework). 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV (discussing how modeling and structuring can help normalize the 
reflection process). 
 9. See infra Part IV. 
 10. See ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., A.B.A. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO 
THE BAR, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL 
CONTINUUM 234–35, 330–33 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT]; ROY STUCKEY 
ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 121–26 (2007) [hereinafter BEST 
PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION]; GREGORY S. MUNRO, INSTITUTE FOR LAW SCHOOL 
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forty years, law schools have been criticized as lacking the integrated 
experience-based curriculum necessary to teach students how to 
provide effective and responsible legal services.11  Scholars, 
practitioners, and judges alike have identified the need for 
educational institutions that train future legal professionals to pay 
more attention to what law students need to learn, how law students 
learn best, what teaching methods are most effective, and what duties 
the law school has to the profession and the society it serves.12  From 
these observations, significant historical and present-day support has 
developed for integrating a reality-based context into teaching law, 
lawyering, or both to help students achieve the level of 
professionalism that justifies a claim to an exclusive right to engage 
in the practice of law.13
The MacCrate Report built upon the American Bar Association’s 
(ABA) efforts to develop, through a dialogue, an understanding of the 
state of professional-skills education in law schools and to determine 
whether law school curriculums were adequately preparing students 
to perform effectively as lawyers after graduation.
  Legal educators have a responsibility to 
reevaluate assumptions about how one learns to “think like a lawyer” 
and discover new methods of conceptualizing and providing student-
centered legal education. 
14  The ABA 
Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar 
established the Task Force on Law Schools and the Profession: 
Narrowing the Gap, which developed a “Statement of Fundamental 
Lawyering Skills and Professional Values” (Statement) to define the 
lawyering skills and professional values necessary to the 
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession (i.e., making 
professional judgments or giving legal advice).15  The Statement is 
the subject of the MacCrate Report (Report), Legal Education and 
Professional Development—An Educational Continuum.16
 
TEACHING, OUTCOME ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS 50–52 (2000) [hereinafter 
MUNRO]. 
  The skills 
and values identified in the Statement include litigation and 
alternative dispute-resolution procedures; factual investigation; 
 11. See BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 1, 8–13. 
 12. See id. at 9; MUNRO, supra note 10, at 51–56. 
 13. See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 10, at 233–36 (describing the benefits of reality-
based clinical programs to the professional development of young lawyers). 
 14. See id. at 123–26 (detailing the ABA’s efforts to determine what skills are necessary 
for effective legal counseling after graduation from law school). 
 15. See id. at xi–xii. 
 16. See id. at 7–8 (noting that the MacCrate Report includes the Statement and uses it to 
identify the role of law schools in the development of law students). 
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striving to promote justice; fairness and morality; striving to improve 
the profession; and professional self-development, among others.17  
The Statement understands “professional self-development” as the 
commitment to increasing one’s own knowledge and improving one’s 
own skills by making use of the process of “reflecting upon and 
learning from their lawyering experiences.”18  The Report states that 
this process involves a critical assessment of one’s own 
performance—including one’s preparation, the performance itself, 
and the identification of practices that will enable replication of 
effective components of the performance and prevent recurrence of 
ineffective ones.19  With the hope of encouraging a stronger sense of 
ownership in students’ own decision making, the Statement places 
more of an emphasis on the student’s individual role in shaping his or 
her own legal education to meet their professional goals and the 
demands of the profession.20  The Report concludes that law schools 
need to recognize that the task of educating students to assume the 
full responsibilities of a lawyer is an ongoing “process that neither 
begins nor ends with three years of law school”; rather, a continuum 
exists that mandates students develop a capacity for self-reflection 
and awareness of their professional practice.21
The decade following the publication of the MacCrate Report 
found bar associations, law schools, and judiciaries formally 
convening in more than twenty-five states to discuss the Report’s 
findings and recommendations.
 
22  From these ongoing discussions, 
members of the Clinical Legal Education Association (CLEA) in 
2001 established a committee of legal practitioners and academics to 
create a “Statement of Best Practices for Legal Education.”23
 
 17. See id. at 138–41. 
  
Professor Roy Stuckey of the University of South Carolina School of 
Law was asked to chair the committee.  The final report, Best 
Practices for Legal Education (Best Practices), developed 
collaboratively over six years, advocates that one of the goals of legal 
 18. Id. at pts. II.5.A, IV.A, II.4.D. 
 19. See id. at pts. IV.C, II.4.E (“Preparation to handle situations necessarily involves an 
ability to deal with more contingencies than turn out to occur.  That kind of 
preparation is the hallmark of professionalism.”). 
 20. See id. at pt. II.4.D (“[S]tudents will be assisted to . . . develop for themselves a 
considered long-range educational agenda aimed at attaining professional competence 
and eventually excellence.”). 
 21. See id. at Introduction. 
 22. Robert MacCrate, Esq., Foreword to BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra 
note 10, at vi. 
 23. Id. 
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institutions must be to help students acquire the attributes of 
effective, responsible lawyers, including “self-reflection and lifelong 
learning skills, intellectual and analytical skills, core knowledge of 
the law, core understanding of law, professional skills, and 
professionalism.”24  The Report calls for law schools to use best 
practices for assessing student learning by first identifying “[t]he 
goals of [the] particular assessment . . . to evaluate a student’s 
knowledge, behavior (what a student does before and after a learning 
experience), performance (ability to perform a task), attitudes and 
values” before and after a learning experience.25  The Report points 
out that these goals require different methods to assess each of the 
educational objectives trying to be achieved.26  For example, 
assessing a student’s capacity for self-reflection or professionalism 
necessitates a different assessment method than for core knowledge 
of the law or analytical analysis.27  The Report calls for more use of 
criteria-referenced assessments that determine how well the 
individual student has achieved the educational objectives of the 
course, rather than normative assessments based on how students 
perform in relation to other students.28  In turn, these assessments are 
used to provide students with formative feedback, which the Report 
emphasizes should “be the primary form of assessment in legal 
education.”29  The Report builds upon the contemporaneous Carnegie 
Report’s findings that contemporary learning theory suggests 
educational effort is greatly enhanced by the use of formative 
assessment while summative assessments (i.e., tests, grades, etc.) are 
“‘devices to protect the public by ensuring basic levels of 
competence.’”30
The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching’s 
report, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law, 
identified effective means of formative assessment as critical to 
educating professionals since the goal of professional schools must 
be to develop practitioners who are cognizant of what they need to do 
 
 
 24. Id. at viii, 48; MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 10, at pt. II.5.A. 
 25. BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 179. 
 26. Id. at 181. 
 27. See id. at 179–84, 190 (noting that cognitive assessments, such as essay questions and 
multiple choice exams, assess learning or knowledge, whereas by actively putting 
students in the role of lawyers, educators can assess each student’s performance and 
competence, which “not only assess students’ knowledge and capabilities, but also 
their professionalism”). 
 28. Id. at 243. 
 29. Id. at 256. 
 30. Id. (quoting WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR 
THE PROFESSION OF LAW 189 (2007)). 
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to engage in the best practice in their profession and to equip them 
with the capacity for self-reflection to pursue expertise—thereby 
becoming “‘metacognitive’ about their own learning.”31  In response, 
Best Practices provides various assessment techniques identified by 
educators and practitioners, specifically “techniques for assessing 
prior knowledge, recall, and understanding,” such as a misconception 
or preconception check prior to a simulation or a discussion on a 
particular material to uncover prior knowledge or beliefs that may 
hinder or block learning.32
The Intentionality framework that I have developed is such an 
assessment technique to assist students in applying a metacognitive 
approach to their own learning.
 
33  It can be used to help law schools 
teach students to develop self-awareness and understand why such 
awareness is so important to the legal practice—a public service 
profession that deals with the manifestations of human behavior on a 
day-to-day basis.34
Critical race, gender, and legal theorists have, for some time now, 
advocated a subjective understanding of human behavior based on 
the subjectivity of knowledge grounded in one’s individual 
experiences.
 
35  However, how do such subjective processes affect 
one’s thinking and decision-making?36  An understanding of our 
cognitive processes is vital to assessing what we think we know.  
Legal theorist, Steven L. Winter, who has written a book assessing 
the implications of cognitive science for law and legal theory, 
explains that cognitive science shows the mind is neither a computer, 
processing input gathered from the senses, nor a cultural concept, at 
the mercy of our own “creativity.”37
 
 31. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 30, at 171–73. 
  Rather, studies show that the 
 32. BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 256–58. 
 33. See infra Part III. 
 34. See infra Part III. 
 35. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND, at xiii 
(2001). 
 36. For example, author Elizabeth Wilson focuses specifically on the field of feminist 
psychology and discusses the implications of a failure to acknowledge advancements 
in neuroscience on feminist psychology.  See ELIZABETH A. WILSON, NEURAL 
GEOGRAPHIES: FEMINISM AND THE MICROSTRUCTURE OF COGNITION (1998).  Wilson 
argues that the exclusion of the body from the concept of gender, which she states has 
become indispensible to feminist psychology’s critical practice, will prevent the 
discipline’s advancement.  See id. at 49–52.  Wilson states, “[A]n antibiological 
gender will too readily reduce an analysis of mental processes, functions, and states to 
the exclusion or trivialization of neurology.”  Id. at 51. 
 37. WINTER, supra note 35, at xi–xii.  Professor Winter is the Walter S. Gibbs Professor 
of Constitutional Law and director of the Center for Legal Studies at Wayne State 
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mind is formed by our interactions with the physical and social 
world.  This is a dynamic and imaginative process that is the 
foundation of “human thought and rationality.”38  However, this 
imaginative process operates in a systematic and orderly way, so, as 
Winters asserts, a capable model of human knowledge can exist.39
Human behavior is a characteristically complex system.
 
Neuroscience is moving towards an objective understanding of the 
influence of subjective factors, such as internal and external stimuli 
and cultural systems, on human thinking.  By understanding our 
cognitive structures and their impact on our reasoning, we can 
understand our own judgment better and improve decision-making. 
40  As Erica 
Beecher-Monas and Dr. Edgar Garcia-Rill explain, “Complexity 
theory explains that we, as individuals, are interacting parts of a 
complex world, we have numerous interactions with our 
environment, and the instigator of our actions, the brain itself, is a 
complex organ.”41  Therefore, complexity theory shows the 
importance of measuring all relevant information in order to make 
more accurate judgments.42
 
University Law School.  He teaches a variety of seminars on topics in legal theory that 
have included Ethics of the Lawyering Experience; Cognitive Science and Law; Law 
and Linguistics; and Racism, Cognitive Theory, and the Law.  He is also the author of 
various articles on constitutional law and legal theory, including The Metaphor of 
Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance; An Upside/Down View of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty; The “Power” Thing; Melville, Slavery, and the 
Failure of the Judicial Process, What Makes Modernity Late?; and Reimagining 
Democracy for Social Individuals.  Faculty Profiles, WAYNE ST. U. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.wayne.edu/faculty/bio.php?id=43027 (last visited May. 12, 2011). 
  Today, relevant information in 
criticizing and restructuring our understanding of human behavior 
includes neuroscientific research and findings.  Perhaps, once we can 
understand how complex the origins of human behavior are, we will 
better be able to prevent certain factors from negatively influencing 
other factors. 
 38. WINTER, supra note 35, at xii. 
 39. Id. at xi–xii. 
 40. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos: Predicting 
Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1885 (2003). 
 41. Id.; see also WILSON, supra note 36, at 51–52 (explaining that by assuming gender to 
be inscribed upon an unchangeable biology (sex), the body is excluded “from 
questions of culturation that the notion of gender alone is thought to entail”).  Wilson 
advocates that the relation of any biological space, structure, or element to its outside 
(thus the nature of biology itself) is figured as one of considerable complexity.  Id. at 
54. 
 42. Beecher-Monas & Garcia-Rill, supra note 40, at 1886. 
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The multidisciplinary study of brain science43 reveals that the 
brain’s mental functions are extremely interactive and dynamic.  
Neuroplasticity44 is now an established theory that the brain is highly 
adaptive and that some brain functions are transferable to different 
brain regions.  Neuroplasticity also refers to learning capacity that is 
more extensive than previously thought.  In fact, studies suggest that 
learning is a process that an individual can effectively utilize despite 
significant lapses and issues of aging.45  For example, comprehension 
of specific material can be consolidated even though the study 
activity has lapsed for several years or has been interrupted due to 
traumatic brain injury.46  Thus, actual learning occurs in “fits and 
starts”47 from one moment to the next.  Often the learning proceeds in 
a backward momentum, which is similar to the way memory is 
reconstructed.  In other words, learning is a “groping” process.48
 
 43. See supra note 4. 
 
 44. “Neuroplasticity” broadly includes changes that can occur both during learning and 
aging; the adult brain has enormous adaptive capacity, or neuroplasticity.  See 
NORMAN DOIDGE, THE BRAIN THAT CHANGES ITSELF: STORIES OF PERSONAL TRIUMPH 
FROM THE FRONTIERS OF BRAIN SCIENCE, at xv (2007). 
 45. See John Dunlosky & Christopher Hertzog, Training Programs to Improve Learning 
in Later Adulthood: Helping Older Adults Educate Themselves, in METACOGNITION IN 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 249, 254–59 (Douglas J. Hacker et al. eds., 
1998) (discussing techniques for continued self-regulated learning for aging 
individuals based upon understanding of brain function). 
 46. Interruptions to engage in play activities during learning sessions can improve the 
capacity to learn and remember.  See, e.g., STUART BROWN & CHRISTOPHER 
VAUGHAN, PLAY: HOW IT SHAPES THE BRAIN, OPENS THE IMAGINATION, AND 
INVIGORATES THE SOUL 99–102 (2009).  Learning is enhanced by interspersing 
aerobic activity.  See JOHN MEDINA, BRAIN RULES: 12 PRINCIPLES FOR SURVIVING AND 
THRIVING AT WORK, HOME, AND SCHOOL 24–25 (2008). 
 47. “Fits and starts” is frequently used to refer to movement that occurs at irregular 
intervals.  Although a tautology (because both fit and start refer to sporadic activity), 
the phrase is more than 300 years old, appearing, for example, in 1620.  See ROBERT 
SANDERSON, D.D., Ad Populum: Sermon 1, in 3 THE WORKS OF ROBERT SANDERSON, 
D.D. 3, 18–19 (William Jacobson, D.D., ed., 1854), available at 
http://www.archive.org/details/worksrobertsand03sanduoft (“[I]f thou hast these 
things only by fits and starts.”). 
 48. Learning has been described as occurring by a series of fits and starts, or “groping.”  
See, e.g., PAUL FREEDMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 98 (1949), 
available at http://www.archive.org/details/principlesofscie029339mbp (describing 
the most difficult scientific learning as “groping through a maze of possibilities and 
difficulties”). 
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II. WE DO NOT KNOW WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW 
I identify five specific theories about brain function or human 
behavior, each of which affects the quality of legal problem-solving.  
The impact of each theory detracts from the intended accuracy of the 
lawyer’s perception and interpretation of data.  I give separate 
treatment to each theory, although they likely overlap in actual 
function.  It is not my intention to provide an overarching scientific 
framework of the interrelationship of these separate points.  I leave 
the development of that global framework to the scientists within 
those disciplines.  The reader should also note that I do not intend any 
hierarchical order to these theories other than I start with a foundation 
theory and then move through perception processes, then 
interpretation methods, and then conclude with memory. 
A.  We Automatically Think We Know More Than We Actually Do: 
We Assume Unconsciously That We Understand More About 
Everything 
Neuroscience confirms the presence of an automatic unconscious 
assumption by the human brain that the individual thinks she or he 
knows more than the individual actually does.49  The human brain 
routinely overestimates how much understanding we have about any 
experience or circumstance.  For example, one study documents an 
“illusion of exploratory depth,” which illustrates that people think 
they understand how and why things occur in “far greater detail” than 
they actually do.50  When tested, their understandings are 
significantly incomplete regarding the dynamics of the systems 
involved.51  Each individual incorrectly believes that they accurately 
perceive, understand, and imagine future experience.52
 
 49. See Leonid Rozenblit & Frank Keil, The Misunderstood Limits of Folk Science: An 
Illusion of Explanatory Depth, 26 COGNITIVE SCI. 521 (2002) (consisting of several 
studies demonstrating that the individual tends to think they know more than they 
actually do); Frank C. Keil, Folkscience: Coarse Interpretations of a Complex Reality, 
7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 368, 369 fig.1 (2003) (discussing the assumption that the 
individuals believe they understand the world in far more detail than they actually do). 
  As I describe 
below, brain functioning often causes significant distortions to what 
 50. Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522. 
 51. Id. at 526–29; see also Keil, supra note 49, at 368. 
 52. Daniel Gilbert devotes an entire book to debunking this distortion in human 
processing by explaining the compelling scientific theory and quantitative studies.  
See generally DANIEL GILBERT, STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2005); see also Jeremy A. 
Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. 
L.J. 155, 173–77 (2005) (supporting Gilbert’s theory by arguing that individuals 
overpredict their level of unpleasant reactions to future negative situations). 
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an individual perceives and remembers.  Yet the brain does not 
recognize these distortions, and the result is that we routinely 
overestimate what we know.53  The initial platform of inaccurate 
perception and faulty inferences form the backdrop to the beginning 
of the lawyer’s deliberate fact investigation and any reasoning based 
thereon.  The organic propensity to assume greater knowledge, at 
least partially, explains why we are often surprised by what we do not 
know about a specific aspect in a given legal case.54  By integrating 
some knowledge about brain science, law students are encouraged to 
question their own inferential processes and intentionally expand 
their data gathering.55
If law students understand that what they “know” may not be 
accurate and, as a result, develop skepticism about what they know, 
they will be more open to learning the tools to avoid both their novice 
assumptions that certain facts exist
  This knowledge allows lawyers to be less 
defensive about what they do not know or what they may have 
misunderstood.  The result is increased openness to further exploring 
the facts and a different approach to problem solving. 
56 and “automatic” jumps to 
inappropriate conclusions on the basis of inadequate fact 
development.57
 
 53. See Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522. 
  When students are taught that our brains reassure us 
that we know more than we do rather than the truth, that our brains 
trick us and fail to alert us to distortions, they will see the value in 
learning these tools. 
 54. See id. at 530–31; Keil, supra note 49, at 368. 
 55. As Rozenblit and Keil have demonstrated, laypersons are often unaware of their lack 
of or incompleteness of knowledge and, generally, have little reason to doubt their 
intuitions.  By being aware of this common fault, lawyers can take proactive steps to 
avoid this.  See Rozenblit & Keil, supra note 49, at 522. 
 56. See generally Keil, supra note 49 (supporting the notion that people tend to think they 
know or understand more than they actually do). 
 57. See Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L. 
REV. 237, 294–95 (2008).  I commonly encounter law students in my Evidence 
courses that make the faulty assumption that all individuals perceive and process facts 
in the same way.  This orientation stands in stark contrast to my instruction that all 
perception is based on drawing inferences from external data.  Teaching students 
about the inferential reasoning process is an essential basis for understanding the law 
of relevance and the necessary fact investigation skills for taking into account 
individual differences in perception. 
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B.  What We Believe to Be Objectively True Is Not Necessarily So: 
Belief Is Simply a Point of View. 
Belief is simply a point of view and is not inherently accurate or 
inaccurate, objectively true or false, or right or wrong.  However, the 
individual—including the legal practitioner—usually operates with 
unquestioned reliance on their beliefs as objectively accurate.58  We 
construct our own point of view as a byproduct of our everyday 
perception of the world and “indeed, it is how we have a world.”59  
We operate under the mistaken belief that our perceptions reflect 
objective reality because we are, more often than not, successful in 
correlating our perceptions to reality.60
Several studies indicate how beliefs shape assessments and create 
distortions that may influence a lawyer’s capacity to predict 
accurately.
 
61  Preferences influence the formation of an individual’s 
belief.62  Fragale and Heath, among other scholars, stand apart for 
their clarity in showing the human propensity to confabulate belief 
with fact.63  Their findings show that individuals automatically 
default to using their specific belief as the accurate measure used in 
the self-educating techniques of trial and error methods in any 
problem-solving process.64  This approach is commonly referred to as 
“heuristics.”65  Perceived reality is based upon individual biases and 
those biases are a product of experience combined with the 
individual’s fundamental beliefs.66
 
 58. See Alison R. Fragale & Chip Heath, Evolving Informational Credentials: The 
(Mis)Attribution of Believable Facts to Credible Sources, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 225, 226–27 (2004); see also Tor, supra note 57, at 255. 
  This means that individuals 
“invest ambiguous information with the meaning” that most favors 
 59. WINTER, supra note 35, at 33. 
 60. Id.  As a professor of Evidence Law for more than twenty years and a practicing law 
professor for even longer, I observe that law students conflate their inferences with 
what they assume to be verifiable external data.  Rather, the separation of inference 
from external fact happens only as a product of explicitly identifying the students’ 
inferences repeatedly. 
 61. See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 225; Tor, supra note 57, at 256. 
 62. Tor, supra note 57, at 254. 
 63. See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27. 
 64. Id. at 233. 
 65. Heuristic – Definition and More from the Free Merriam–Webster Dictionary, 
MERRIAM–WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/heuristic (last 
visited May 12, 2011) (defining Heuristics as “involving or serving as an aid to 
learning, discovery, or problem-solving by experimental and especially trial-and-error 
methods; also:  of or relating to exploratory problem-solving techniques that utilize 
self-educating techniques (as the evaluation of feedback) to improve performance”). 
 66. See Tor, supra note 57, at 253–55. 
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their individual self-interest.67  Individuals readily conflate what is 
belief with what is actual fact, because if we did not do so we would 
not be able to function in the most mundane of daily tasks.68  A 
problematic consequence of this default functioning of conflating 
belief with fact is that we “align [our] expectations” of outcomes in 
problem solving “with [our] preferences about [those] outcomes.”69
For example, Fragale and Heath concretely demonstrate how we 
use belief as an oversimplified heuristic that leads to inaccurate 
perception.
 
70  Specifically, they demonstrate how readily individuals 
credit their beliefs to credible sources.  And the more the individual 
believes their proposition to be true, the more likely the individual 
will be to credit their belief to “high-credibility sources.”71  This 
heuristic comes from the “well-developed association between 
credible sources and truthful information.”72  Fragale and Heath 
demonstrate how individuals rely on the “well-learned cognitive 
shortcut” of the “simple-decision rule” that expert knowledge is 
reliable when spontaneously judging the accuracy of the data.73  In 
any given circumstance, the objective accuracy may often not 
correlate with the spontaneous judgment.74  Fragale and Heath 
confirm that individuals confuse their subjective belief in the truth of 
a statement with the objective truth of the statement.75
We do not routinely include in our perception the consideration that 
our belief forms the basis for our determination of what is true.  Yet, 
belief inevitably colors judgment even when there is the expectation 




 67. Id. at 255.  One may argue, therefore, that one’s learning capacity is profoundly 
influenced by one’s biases.  See id. 
  This understanding 
does not deny the existence of a “reality” or actual facts; Instead, it 
reinforces the objective truth that there are multiple interpretations of 
the actual facts.  What one “sees” is heavily dependent on that 
individual’s previous contextual history of what their visual 
 68. See id. at 256–57. 
 69. Id. at 256. 
 70. Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 225, 227–33 (discussing three scientific studies 
that demonstrate how individuals attribute their beliefs to credible sources). 
 71. Id. at 226–27. 
 72. Id. at 226. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 226–27. 
 76. See WINTER, supra note 35, at 33. 
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experiences have taught them to see.77  We interpret what we actually 
see within our established framework of previous understandings.78  
This concept is also clarified by the term “predictably irrational” as 
used in the explanation that economic choices are often made before 
conscious thought, which rationalizes the choices.79
Other studies also illustrate how one’s beliefs regularly distort his 
or her predictions by, for example, overestimating personal abilities 
and overpredicting the likelihood of successful outcomes.
 
80  As a 
consequence, lawyers may not anticipate degrees of risk nor plan a 
course of action appropriately.81  Psychological research confirms 
that individuals are unable “to accurately predict future emotional 
states” of themselves or others, particularly in terms of intensity and 
duration.82  Rather, the research demonstrates that individuals are 
hard-wired to overestimate the degree of future emotional states.83  
Furthermore, research studies show that individuals will more 
strongly react to negative content than to pleasurable content.84  This 
natural tendency leads to overestimating future negative experience 
and undervaluing future neutral or positive experience.85  Thus, brain 
science has begun to provide us with tools to understand the 
operation of the mental functions we use in carrying out lawyering 
tasks, whether conscious or not.86
 
 77. Id. at 34 (discussing Jerome S. Bruner & Leo Postman, On the Perception of 
Incongruity: A Paradigm, 18 J. PERSONALITY 206 (1949); quoting THOMAS KUHN, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 113 (2d ed. 1970)). 
  Applying our understandings from 
brain science may increase the law student’s receptivity to becoming 
 78. Id. at 34–36. 
 79. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR 
DECISIONS, at XXX, 243 (1st rev. & expanded ed. 2009). 
 80. Tor, supra note 57, at 254 (citing Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon Brown, Illusion and 
Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 193, 195 (1988); Shelley E. Taylor & Jonathon Brown, Positive Illusions and 
Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 22 
(1994); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980)). 
 81. See id. at 245–55 (stating that people generally underestimate risks and fail to take 
appropriate action). 
 82. Blumenthal, supra note 52, at 155, 167. 
 83. Id. at 166–67 (citing Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winner and Accident Victims: Is 
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 926 (1978)). 
 84. See id. at 176. 
 85. See id. at 175–76 (citing Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of 
Durability Bias in Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617, 
618–20, 636 (1998)). 
 86. See WINTER, supra note 35, at 2–3. 
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more self-aware in the execution of legal tasks and therefore more 
able to exercise better clinical judgment. 
Decision-making is a prerequisite to conscious action.  However, 
studies indicate that individuals take actions milliseconds before 
becoming conscious of making the decision to act.87  Brain research 
suggests that our actions are initiated by unconscious mental 
processes before we become aware of our intention to act.88  We can 
thus reasonably infer that the default human inclination is to 
overestimate the degree of conscious choice in dictating action before 
awareness.89  Judge Morris B. Hoffman acknowledges that 
neuroscience is producing evidence that decisions are products of 
complex brain function and therefore there remains little utility to 
think of behavior as simply habitual, mindless, or unthinking.90
There exists extensive knowledge and applied theory on the range 
of complex brain functions also known as “executive functions.”
 
91  
Executive function refers to the large set of metacognitive processes 
in the brain that, among other abilities, help us plan, incorporate past 
knowledge, track time, simultaneously pay attention to multiple 
things, reflect, redirect and modify our choices, and supplement our 
fact gathering.92
 
 87. Benjamin Libet, Unconscious Cerebral Initiative and the Role of Conscious Will in 
Voluntary Action, 8 BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 529, 533 tbl.1 (1985). 
  Nor is there utility in holding onto the inaccurate 
belief that all our behavioral choices are conscious or entirely a 
product of free will.  We may function with the belief that we are 
driven almost entirely by free will but that belief is seriously 
 88. Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants of Free Decisions in the Human 
Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008); Id. at 536. 
 89. See Soon et al., supra note 88, at 543. 
 90. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1667, 1671 (2004). 
 91. See RICHARD E. NISBETT, INTELLIGENCE AND HOW TO GET IT: WHY SCHOOLS AND 
CULTURE COUNT 49–51 (2009). 
 92. See id. at 7; see also Sheldon H. Horowitz, Executive Functioning and Learning 
Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR LEARNING DISABILITIES (Mar. 1, 2007), 
http://www.ncld.org/ld-basics/ld-aamp-executive-functioning/basic-ef-facts/executive 
-functioning-and-learning-disabilities.  In my article To Be of Service, I identified 
several mental processes associated with both the intuitive skills as well as the range 
of executive functions, which I articulated in a framework of interconnecting both the 
Perceptive Self and the Knowing Self.  See Beryl Blaustone, To Be of Service: The 
Lawyer’s Aware Use of the Human Skills Associated with the Perceptive Self, 15 J. 
LEGAL PROF. 241, 264–68 (1990). 
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questioned by many researchers and scholars.93  As a result, Judge 
Hoffman argues for revisiting our understanding of how judges, 
jurors, and legislators make decisions.94
In fact, there are many scholarly experiments that repeatedly 
document the basic human behavior to collect information that 
validates one’s pre-existing prejudices and biases.
 
95  Any human 
being will more likely gravitate towards the information, which 
corroborates one’s pre-existing point of view and subconsciously 
dismiss data that undermines one’s point of view.96  Some research 
studies document the effects of group identity in creating a double 
moral standard of fairness.97  However, studies also demonstrate that 
individuals are able to fall back upon their intuitive sense of fairness 
if they are preoccupied with other mental functions, which disallow 
the ability to rationalize one’s actions.98  Given all the validation that 
belief influences what we determine to be objective truth,99
Most of our beliefs go untested.  Some studies have shown a strong 
correlation between whether we believe a statement to be true with 
our judgment of the credibility of the source.
 we should 
embed a deliberate practice that promotes doubt and encourages us to 
disconnect or create separation for ourselves from our impulses in 
formulating a point of view. 
100  For instance, a rumor 
or false statement of fact is often taken as true if attributed to a 
reputable source.101
 
 93. See Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing 
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775, 1781 
(2004). 
  The predilection to gravitate toward confirming 
evidence of our beliefs adversely affects the quality of our data 
 94. Hoffman, supra note 90, at 1673. 
 95. See, e.g., Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White?, 88 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 447, 447–48 (2005). 
 96. Jessica Winet et al., Do We See Barack Obama and John McCain as Equally 
American? It Depends on Your Lenses!, poster presented at the 89th Annual 
Convention of the W. Psychological Ass’n, Portland, Or. (Apr. 22, 2009); see also 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., What? Me Biased?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A39, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/30/opinion/30kristof.html?_r=1 
(discussing Devo’s studies of race in the 2008 presidential election). 
 97. Piercarlo Valdesolo & David DeSteno, The Duality of Virtue: Deconstructing the 
Moral Hypocrite, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1334, 1334-37 (2008); see also 
John Tierney, Deep Down, We Can’t Fool Even Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/science/01tier.html (discussing computer task 
studies relating to moral hypocrisy). 
 98. Valdesolo & DeSteno, supra note 97, at 1336–37. 
 99. Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27. 
 100. Id. at 229 (results from Study 1). 
 101. Id. at 225–26. 
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gathering processes in the full range of tasks in legal problem-
solving.102  For example, a lawyer who searches for confirming 
evidence and ignores conflicting evidence will develop an inadequate 
theory of the case for trial or present the client with problem-solving 
options that limit rather than expand the client’s options.103
C.  The Objects We Perceive Are Not Necessarily As They Appear to 
Be: Perceptual Blind Spots Exist in All Cognitive Functions 
  By 
teaching the Intentionality framework, teachers aid law students in 
developing an internal monitor essential for self-regulated learning in 
professional practice. 
Perceptual blind spots are part of all cognitive function, and 
therefore looking is never the same as seeing.  Perception is quite 
porous yet our default behavior is to assume that our looking is the 
same as accurately seeing the objective external world.  Reality and 
memory are “constructs” of the brain rather than truly “mirror[ed]” 
images.104  We most often experience perceptions as “‘corresponding’ 
to an objective reality.”105  The successful correlation of our day-to-
day interactions with the external world creates the misimpression 
that our beliefs correspond to objective reality.106  As lawyers, we 
assume that we can easily assess the distortion of perception by 
client, witness, and fact-finder.  We may not, however, question the 
impact of our own organic level of perceptual distortion.  What we 
absorb visually is full of perceptual holes, but our brains fill in the 
rest of the picture very well;107 however, this does not mean our 
filling in is highly accurate.108
What matters is how we focus our attention on what we see.  We 
are creatively filling in from previous moments and previous 





 102. Id. at 226–27. 
  We do not notice the gaps unless something appears 
to be out of place.  For instance, the individual may paint in the 
existence of a stop sign rather than a yield sign at the scene of an 
 103. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. (2009) (stating that competent 
representation requires adequate preparation and evaluation of the evidence). 
 104. WINTER, supra note 35, at 33. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 34 (citing KUHN, supra note 77, at 113). 
 108. See id. at 35–36. 
 109. See id. 
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accident110—this is why some studies observe participants watching 
magic tricks.111
Magic tricks show us that what matters in seeing is the point of 
attention.
 
112  What holds our attention may not be what is objectively 
true or decisive.  Magicians intentionally misdirect and thus distort 
the observer’s perception by controlling the social cues.  The brain 
function of perceiving fact is not predominately driven by visuomotor 
control.113  In other words, the process of perception is more “than 
what meets the eye.”114  In fact, most participants who watched a 
disappearing ball trick were convinced that they saw a ball in the air 
that never left the hand of the magician.115  Events may occur in full 
view and yet be unnoticed by the observer.  Studies of both “change 
blindness,” which happens by interrupting the viewing, and 
“inattentional blindness,” in which the observer’s focus on specific 
tasks causes the failure to detect fact, demonstrate how difficult it is 
to register what should be perceived.116  We create information out of 
what we see, and we fill in assumed information with the received 
information in order to make sense out of any circumstance.117
“Presentism” is “[t]he tendency for current experience to influence 
one’s views of the past and the future.”
  We 
are too comfortable with our subjective perceptual experience, which 
allows us to believe that our brain’s perceptual processing of all our 
day-to-day events corresponds to an accurate objective reality. 
118  Predictable error occurs 
because the individual is operating with the unconscious assumption 
that the future will be like the present.119
 
 110. See infra text accompanying notes 152–53. 
  “[O]nly a small portion of 
[the] sensory information [from our eyes, ears, and skin] ever arrives 
 111. See Benjamin W. Tatler & Gustav Kuhn, Don’t Look Now: The Magic of 
Misdirection, in EYE MOVEMENTS: A WINDOW ON MIND AND BRAIN 697 (Roger P.G. 
van Gompel et al. eds., 2007); Gustav Kuhn & Michael F. Land, There’s More to 
Magic Than Meets the Eye, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY, at R950 (2006); Gustav Kuhn & 
Benjamin W. Tatler, Magic and Fixation: Now You Don’t See It, Now You Do, 34 
PERCEPTION 1155 (2005); Gustav Kuhn et al., Misdirection in Magic: Implications for 
the Relationship Between Eye Gaze and Attention, 16 VISUAL COGNITION 391 (2008). 
 112. Kuhn & Tatler, supra note 111, at 1156. 
 113. Kuhn & Land, supra note 111, at R950. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Kuhn et al., supra note 111, at 391–92; Tatler & Kuhn, supra note 111, at 699. 
 117. See WINTER, supra note 35, at 95–97 (discussing a research experiment with Linda, a 
feminist bank teller). 
 118. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 121. 
 119. See id. at 126–27. 
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in our conscious awareness.”120  We recognize these misimpressions 
only when something goes wrong and we become more aware of 
perceptual defects.121  In other words, we more readily notice 
something when it is “wrong” or out of place, meaning that we often 
form perception based on expectation.122  When we do not notice the 
distortion, we operate as though it does not exist.  However, some 
level of distortion does exist; it simply may not appear to be so out of 
place that it is worth our noticing.123  The problem is that the 
distortion may be significant even though we are unaware of its 
presence.  Perception by its very nature means that we never see the 
same image twice.124  Studies also show that we make value 
judgments instantaneously about other individuals based upon less 
than conscious reactions to facial expression.125
The antidote to perceptual blindness is to incorporate the 
Intentionality framework in which we consciously assume that all 
perception contains defects and thus routinely remain open to 
subjecting our observations to further scrutiny. 
 
D.  Accurate Recall Is a Falsehood 
Human beings assume that their memory is more accurate than it is.  
In order to make sense of what is recalled, each person must fill in 
information beyond what the person actually physically stores in his 
or her brain.  The “sheer mass” of all the sensory data that is sifted 
during daily activity would immobilize the individual’s cognitive 
resources if the brain had to recall all the information consciously.126  
In other words, humans fill in gaps with assumed information in 
order to make sense of any external circumstance.127
 
 120. Daniel T. Smith, Research, DURHAM UNIV., http://www.dur.ac.uk/daniel.smith2/ 
Research%20Interests.htm (last visited May 12, 2011). 
  Law students, 
however, are not adequately challenged in their view of the accuracy 
of their own recall and are minimally exposed to the inaccuracies of 
 121. WINTER, supra note 35, at 33. 
 122. See id. 
 123. See id. at 33–34. 
 124. See H. Sebastian Seung & Daniel D. Lee, The Manifold Ways of Perception, 290 SCI. 
2268, 2268 (2000) (stating that people “never see the same face twice” because “facial 
images . . . vary from moment to moment . . . [and] sensory inputs are in flux”). 
 125. See, e.g., Alexander Todorov et al., Evaluating Faces on Trustworthiness After 
Minimal Time Exposure, 27 SOC. COGNITION 813, 813–19 (2009) (concluding that in 
less than 100 milliseconds people can make accurate trustworthiness judgments based 
on nothing more than facial expressions). 
 126. WINTER, supra note 35, at 96–97. 
 127. See id. at 95. 
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their clients’ and witnesses’ recall.128  Although there is some 
imperative to understand credibility issues, law instructors do not 
emphasize that replaying of memory is inherently inaccurate, even 
after being tested for credibility defects.129  Law students do not 
understand that memory is a process of filling in what is not recalled 
and for leaving out recalled data that does not help to recreate the 
memory.  Source amnesia is one such routine example of the porous 
character of actual memory.130  As fact imprints move from 
hippocampus to cortex, the fact imprint is separated from the context 
in which it was perceived—for instance, not recalling how one 
learned a basic fact like the name of a street.131  Complete experience 
is not stored but “a few critical threads” are, and the recollection 
gives the illusion that full memory was stored and retrieved.132
Source amnesia partially explains why a person may not be able to 
discern the truth of statements of fact.
 
133  Moreover, the passage of 
time and attributing the information source as highly credible will 
influence how the information is remembered.134  This influence may 
lead to remembering what did not happen with a great deal of detail 
that is consistent with the credible source.135  Misattribution occurs 
when information is recalled that did not happen, or is attributed 
incorrectly to a time and place, or actually did happen but the mind 
attributes the recall to imagination.136
 
 128. Professor Berger’s identification experiment in evidence class.  Professor Vivian 
Berger, renowned evidence law professor and legal scholar (recently deceased), 
conducted studies among her law students at Brooklyn Law School to demonstrate for 
them that their inaccurate recall of external facts was substantial and that their 
conviction of belief reinforced those inaccuracies.  The Eyewitness Identification 
Laboratory in the Psychology Department at the University of Iowa has done 
extensive scientific studies establishing the inaccuracies of eyewitness testimony and 
has been influential in the reform of witness identification procedures. 
  “Suggestibility” is the 
tendency to incorporate misleading information from external sources 
 129. This observation is the author’s point of view stemming from my experience in 
teaching evidence and lawyering skills for twenty-eight years and from my live-case 
clinical supervision of law students for fourteen years. 
 130. See Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226. 
 131. See Pablo Alvarez & Larry R. Squire, Memory Consolidation and the Medial 
Temporal Lobe: A Simple Network Model, 91 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
7041, 7042 (1994). 
 132. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 87. 
 133. Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 226–27. 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 226–27, 234. 
 136. See id. at 234; Daniel Schacter et al., The Seven Sins of Memory: Implications for Self, 
1001 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 226, 228 (2003), available at http://www.wjh. 
harvard.edu/~scanlab/papers/2003_Schacter_SevenSinsSelf.pdf. 
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into personal recollections and can be caused by overt suggestion.137
All this is to say that it is quite possible in any situation for an 
individual, including a lawyer, to remember a “statement” as true 
when originally it was false.  Practicing Intentionality and paying 
attention to why sources feel familiar, paying attention to external 
expectations about recall, identifying suggestive questions, and not 
making snap judgments will reduce the effects of both misattribution 
and suggestibility.
 
Both misattribution and suggestibility can easily occur in the 
lawyering context of interviewing witnesses and clients.  It is 
important for lawyers to recognize that a memory is not a static 
recollection of an event.  It is constantly being influenced in the 
process of recall and in the interactions between the lawyer and the 
person who is engaged in recollection.  It is important that the lawyer 
does not try to edit the person’s recollection by dismissing seemingly 
irrelevant material, which could be crucial in cueing material that is 
relevant to the case, or interrupting the witness’s cognitive narrative 
with overt suggestions that might encourage the client or witness to 
please the interviewer.  There is a delicate balance between listening, 
guiding, and probing that must be maintained so the client’s 
recollection process occurs as unaffected by the lawyer as possible.  
Even then, the lawyer must maintain an awareness of the process of 
memory recall and its default operations.  If something does not seem 
right, the lawyer can probe the witness while trying as much as 
possible to not contribute to either suggestibility or misattribution in 
the client’s memory recall. 
138
Also, “information acquired after an event alters memory of the 
event.”
 
139  The information is not actually part of the event because it 
is inserted afterwards.  Ordinarily, people cannot tell when they are 
both filling in gaps or leaving data out and creating gaps because it 
happens unconsciously and quickly.140  The human brain is supplying 
best guesses without asking permission.141  Our current experience 
influences our recreation of the past and influences our view of the 
future,142 though we do fill in with a degree of accuracy.143
 
 137. See Schacter et al., supra note 136, at 228–29. 
  
 138. See DANIEL L. SCHACTER, THE SEVEN SINS OF MEMORY: HOW THE MIND FORGETS AND 
REMEMBERS 8–9, 111, 137 (2001); infra Part III. 
 139. See GILBERT, supra note 52, at 88. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 90. 
 142. See id. at 125–27. 
 143. See id. at 89. 
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“Memory . . . is a dynamic property of populations of neurons; the 
basic mechanism is synaptic change, but memory occurs as a system 
property.”144  Individual sensory maps become memory.145  The 
individual is unconsciously inclined to recall what one thought, did, 
or said by substituting what the individual now thinks, does, or 
says.146
Memory is thus a recreating process, fabrication woven among 
essential threads of bits of accurate recall.
 
147  Suggestibility continues 
to influence memory even when the person remembering understands 
this concept and is told that the exercise is a trick.148  For instance in 
one study, the readers are instructed that after reading a list they will 
give the wrong answer as to what word was left out of the list.149  The 
list has terms in the categories of rest, fatigue, bedding, and 
dreaming.  The reader will quickly identify that the word “gasoline” 
was not among the terms read.150  However, the reader will also 
misremember the word “sleep” as listed among the terms when, in 
fact, it was absent.  Here, memory is actually incorrectly filling in 
details not stored.151
In another study, individuals watched a series of slides in which a 
car slows down at a yield sign and then turns the corner and hits a 
pedestrian.
 
152  Some participants were then prompted to recall what 
happened when the car stopped at the stop sign.  Then, those 
participants were shown two slides: one with the car at a stop sign 
and one with the car at a yield sign.  Ninety percent of the responders 
indicated that the slide with the stop sign was what they originally 
saw.153
In a meeting among a clinical legal supervisor, a legal intern, and a 
client, the legal intern made a statement about an important aspect of 
the case that the legal intern remembered the client having said.  The 
client responded that she had never said such a thing and that she 
  Thus, memory is extremely susceptible to subsequent 
distortion.  This observation emphasizes that this distortion is greater 
than commonly acknowledged by lawyers. 
 
 144. WINTER, supra note 35, at 28. 
 145. Id. at 29–31. 
 146. GILBERT, supra note 52, at 125–26. 
 147. Id. at 87. 
 148. Id. at 88–90. 
 149. Id. at 88. 
 150. Id. at 88–89. 
 151. Id. at 89. 
 152. Id. at 87. 
 153. Id. at 87–88. 
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would never make such a representation.154
E.  The Processes of Reasoning and Decision-Making Do Not Exist 
Independent of the Body.
  In the subsequent 
debriefing of the meeting, the supervisor discussed her surprise and 
also questioned whether she had also “filled in” that gap because she 
said that this may be due to how her memory operates.  The legal 
intern responded with relief and said “Aha, maybe I filled that in 
too!”  The supervisor reports that a powerful discussion followed 
about the necessity for self-monitoring in the filling in of the gaps in 
our recall.  The key point for the supervisor was that she rarely had 
such an explicit discussion about this issue in supervision meetings 
and that she thought these discussions are extremely valuable.  This 
illustrates the value of practicing some stages of the Intentionality 
framework in clinical supervision. 
155
Developments in the cognitive sciences over the past two decades 
reveal that our cognitive processes, such as the abilities to 
conceptualize and to reason, are imaginative processes grounded in 
our interactions with our environment, such that “imagination . . . is 
the soul of human thinking.”
 
156  Therefore, in order to understand 
such processes we must understand their relationship to the vessel—
our embodiment—in which they occur.157
All aspects of cognition, such as ideas, thoughts, and concepts, are 
dependent on a functioning brain, which operates the human body 
while it lives in an environment shaped by physical, cultural, social, 




 154. Professor Maria Arias, CUNY School of Law, provided this example when discussing 
the content of this article with the author; Muneer I. Ahmad, The Ethics of Narrative, 
11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 117 (2003) (noting that narrative is indicative of 
cross-cultural biases). 
  Influenced by all of these factors, the 
brain sets up structures for how we experience and how we 
understand the world in which we live.  Therefore, thought and 
reason do not exist independent of the body; rather, the very structure 
 155. WINTER, supra note 35, at xi–xii.  This is a central tenet of Winter’s book, which 
discusses the momentous implications of the discovery that human thought is 
grounded in our physical and social interactions with the world around us. The 
premise underlying this book is straightforward—a better theory of the mind should 
contribute to a better understanding of the products of the mind (that is law, 
philosophy, etc.).  Id. 
 156. Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 846 (2007). 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
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of our thoughts comes from the nature of our bodies.159  This is what 
is referred to as “embodied mind,” a term developed by cognitive 
linguists and philosophers George Lakoff and Mark L. Johnson.160
The concept of the “embodied mind” runs counter to the central 
Western philosophical notion of “disembodied mind,” which 
understands “reason” as a separate phenomenon independent of the 
functioning human body.
 
161  In the legal academy, the perspective of 
the disembodied mind construes legal reasoning as the application of 
literal and objective categories or principles to a set of facts.  
However, cognitive science reveals that reason is not independent of 
subjective bodily experiences, such as perception, movement, and 
environment.162
Empirical evidence within the field of cognitive science reveals 
that people build categories around and understand other concepts by 
similarity to a prototype.
  Tapping into such subjective, and often unconscious, 
factors has implications on understanding how an individual’s 
conceptualization and reasoning processes may be static or, 
alternatively, capable of growth. 
163  The phenomenon of “prototype effects” 
is attributed to the work of the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch 
and her colleagues, who illustrated this phenomenon through a bird 
study.164  This study revealed that, in America, robins and sparrows 
are generally thought of as being at the center of the category “birds,” 
thus establishing cognitive reference points for people’s reasoning 
about birds.165  Participants in the study also put chickens, ostriches, 
and penguins into the “bird” category but not at the center of the 
category.166  Rather, depending on the perceived closeness of the item 
(chicken, ostrich, or penguin) to the prototype (sparrow or robin), the 
perspective of the mind created differing distances from the center of 
the category for each item.167  This distancing effect among items 
with different characteristics is caused by “principles of extension.”168
 
 159. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK L. JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED 
MIND AND ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 77 (1999). 
  
This is a process of categorization using bodily experience as a 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 75–77. 
 162. Id. at 77. 
 163. See Johnson, supra note 156, at 851 (discussing Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference 
Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 532, 532–45 (1975)). 
 164. See id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 192, 199, 205). 
 165. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1). 
 166. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1). 
 167. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 201 tbl.1). 
 168. Id. (discussing Rosch, supra note 163, at 532–47). 
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directional compass for structuring our cognitive processes.169  This 
categorization process is what establishes patterns, which the mind 
uses to reason and create meaning.170  This meaning is formed from 
our bodily experiences interacting with space, time, movement, and 
control, all of which are rooted in our sensory-motor systems.171  The 
brain translates bodily experience into abstract thought.  This 
dynamic and fluid process of creation and expansion of categories 
through bodily experience is known as “conceptual metaphor.”172  
Metaphors are motivated by our images and experiences so that 
someone who has not previously heard the expression is still able to 
infer their meaning by “mapping” their literal meaning onto a more 
abstract domain.173  Consider the metaphors “you are being closed 
minded” or “you are very open minded,” which are commonly used 
to explain someone’s breadth of view or willingness to engage with 
new or different things.  These metaphors are grounded in our daily 
images of, and experiences with, objects that can be closed and 
opened, such as a door.  A closed door blocks the ability of someone 
to enter while an open door invites entrance or even easy access.  
Doors also are generally both opened and closed; therefore, this 
metaphor implies an element of control that someone has over their 
own willingness or ability to be open minded or closed minded.  The 
mapping of the literal meanings of “closed” and “open” are mapped 
onto the more abstract domain of whether someone is willing to 
engage.  Consider also Steven Winter’s example of the metaphor, 
“the proof of the pudding is in the eating,” which, as Winter explains, 
one can reason to its metaphoric meaning even if unfamiliar with the 
cliché.174
 
 169. Id. at 846, 851. 
  By understanding specific facts about puddings—that even 
though a pudding has appeared to have gelled on the outside does not 
mean it has congealed on the inside, and even though a pudding looks 
 170. Id. at 851. 
 171. See id. at 846. 
 172. Id. at 857.  Johnson uses the example of a container to show how our bodily 
experiences in combination with our cognitive processes allow us to extend embodied 
meaning and thought to the highest level of abstraction possible for us, all the way up 
to science, philosophy, mathematics, logic, and law.  The metaphor “categories are 
containers” has its foundation in our experiences with a container in which we learn 
the logic of containment (i.e. “interior,” “exterior,” “boundary,” etc.); thus providing 
the foundation for concepts like “in” and “out.”  “Categories are containers” is created 
by mapping the domain of spatial containment onto our understanding of conceptual 
categorization.  Id. at 857. 
 173. WINTER, supra note 35, at 50–51. 
 174. Id. 
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good does not mean it will taste good—one can infer the general 
suggestion of the metaphor, which is to approach things 
pragmatically rather than judging by appearance.175
Conceptual metaphors are the basic building blocks that enable 
communication and are essential to the creation of all meaning.
 
176  
However, the processes of metaphorical inference happen rapidly and 
are performed unconsciously.177  Many of the most basic conceptual 
metaphors are developed during childhood by assigning a subjective 
thought to a bodily experience.178  A baby that feels warmth 
associates it with affection and the abstract idea of “affection” will 
always be associated as being “warm.”179  We unconsciously recall 
these experiences and their metaphorical meanings.  This is how we 
use the embodied mind to reason and understand abstract thought.  
Thus, individuals determine truth based on their particular formation 
of metaphor from their physical interactions with the external 
world.180
Learning is a process of the individual brain engaging in making 
flexible metaphorical order out of confusion and in external 
interaction with social reality.
 
181  In contrast, legal reasoning 
traditionally has imposed an arbitrary, external, and pre-existing 
order that is inconsistent with the way an individual learns through 
using metaphor.182  Thus, the evidence that learning occurs by means 
of applying flexible use of metaphor is in opposition to the rigid use 
of categorization often used in legal analysis, which is understood as 
the categorical reason or “rule” for a decision and as being 
advantageous for its clarity and predictability.183
 
 175. Id. at 50. 
  Although legal 
reasoning requires flexibility in the process of analogy and 
distinction, these processes are often used in order to polarize legal 
 176. Id. at 50–51. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Johnson, supra note 156, at 859. 
 179. Id. (citing LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 159, at 48–49). 
 180. See id. at 859–61. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See WINTER, supra note 35, at 187.  Legal realism acknowledges that knowledge is 
subjective, and, therefore, law is not based on objective laws and principles that can 
logically apply, but rather is largely based on one’s own political, social, and moral 
views.  See id. at 41–42.  However, strict-constructionism is still a prevailing view 
among many jurists who view law as an external “thing” that operates in a rule-like 
fashion.  See id. at 206–11. 
 183. Id. at 43, 57. 
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understanding into opposites.184  Neuroplasticity is the established 
theory that the brain has the ability throughout one’s life to 
reorganize itself by forming new neural connections and adjusting its 
activities to respond to new situations or changes in the 
environment.185  This concept is in opposition to the predominate 
lawyering disposition to dismiss the influence of a broad range of 
brain dynamics used in conscious manipulation of categories, which 
are the building blocks of any reasoning process.186
My Intentionality framework starts with the assumption of 
misunderstanding rather than common understanding.  In order to 
overcome these differences, and to come to what might be some form 
of common understanding, law students or lawyers must first begin 
by intentionally examining their own underlying metaphors and 
categories that produce their memories.  Mark Johnson strips away 
the top layer of legal reasoning and exposes the inner working of 
legal reasoning by explaining how the brain understands metaphor 
and inferences.
 
187  Veda Collmer, one of my research assistants, 
observed the importance of Johnson’s deconstruction of the legal 
reasoning process into metaphor and inference as cognitively 
significant in her capacity to construct a deliberate metacognitive 
framework for monitoring her internal reasoning process.188
For instance, while briefing a case, I will determine what 
categories are present and what analogies and distinctions 
can be drawn from these categories.  This awareness of the 
  She 
wrote: 
 
 184. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 258–59 (explaining the tendency for lawyers to 
analyze matters by dividing issues into dichotomies). 
 185. See DOIDGE, supra note 44, at 24–26. 
 186. I have previously theorized several categories of mental functions in competent legal 
problem-solving.  See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 241.  I defined Perceptive Self to 
include “skills associated with nonjudgmental listening and expressing; the ability to 
monitor internal bias; attending skills for accurate understanding of others; and the 
ability to see patterns from analogy and from shifts in examining particularities to 
examining generalities.”  Id. at 241, 265.  My theories of “Perceptive Self” in 
lawyering are based in psychological theory.  I now argue that reformulating theories 
of Perceptive Self to include brain function will ground the law student with more 
credible hypotheses of the importance of other mental functions in evaluating data and 
performing analytic tasks.  I did not focus on the issues of error in recall, perception, 
and prediction, which we now know are present even with the conscious integration of 
function that I advocated in that piece. 
 187. See Johnson, supra note 156, at 864–67. 
 188. Written statement of Veda Collmer, 2008 Graduate of CUNY Sch. of Law (Sept. 21, 
2007) (on file with author). 
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mechanics of legal reasoning has enhanced my skills . . . . I 
used these skills in my judicial writing class, where I wrote 
an opinion involving a police car chase and the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment.  I extended the metaphor for deadly force 
used with a gun to deadly force used when ramming a car.  I 
analogized and distinguished between the two to develop 
sound reasoning that would support my holding.  My only 
experience with guns was that I knew they were deadly.  
However, I had experience with vehicles.  I drew on my 
experiences with cars to analogize to the deadly force posed 
by guns.189




human memory has me more reflective and self-aware about 
how an individual uses his or her memory to recall events 
and construct the past.  An understanding of what 
neuroscience has revealed . . . the true nature of memory and 
all its “sins” has made me think more about interviewing 
clients and witnesses, including the use of this knowledge to 
attack eyewitness testimony, mediate a conflict between two 
parties who each have completely different versions of the 
events that led them to mediation, or assisting a client in 
recalling events as accurately as possible..
  This is because human inclination relies on the unconscious 
assumption of common understanding and, by default, takes it for 
granted that there exists a shared foundation of metaphor and 
categorization.  Practicing my Intentionality framework improves 
lawyers’ clinical judgment because consciously examining their 
internal thinking on choice of metaphor or category gives lawyers an 
opportunity to assess if they have the correct meaning at a specific 
choice-point in legal decision making.  At a minimum, lawyers will 
be less likely to assume common understanding.  Law students are 
able to deliberately counteract the pitfalls in their memory process.  
One of my legal research assistants wrote that knowledge about 
191
 
 189. Id. 
 
 190. See, e.g., Daniel L. Schacter, Seven Sins of Memory: Insights from Psychology and 
Cognitive Science, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 182, 183 (1999) (describing the many ways 
memory can be inaccurate and erroneous). 
 191. Written statement of Joanna Donbeck, 2008 Graduate of CUNY Sch. of Law (Jan. 29, 
2008) (on file with author).  In embracing the Intentionality framework and making 
fewer assumptions about brain function and human behavior, Ms. Donbeck placed 
importance on the work of Schacter, supra note 190, at 182–203. 
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III.  INTENTIONALITY—A METACOGNITIVE FRAMEWORK 
TO MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF DEFAULT HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR 
The Intentionality framework is a metacognitive process that 
involves examining one’s thoughts to compensate for erroneous 
default thinking and behavioral habits.  Metacognition, the scientific 
study of methods of examining one’s thought processes, encourages 
intentional mental behaviors that can be used to improve the quality 
of one’s thinking by examining thoughts about one’s internal mental 
representations.192
The Intentionality framework provides teachers, students, and 
lawyers with a method to embed an internal monitor that prompts us 
to resist default thinking and to be better problem solvers.  By 
frequently making it a point to internally check in within oneself and 
by cultivating the habit of self-awareness and questioning one’s basic 
assumptions, lawyers will be better fact gatherers who are able to 
communicate more effectively and accurately understand others in 
helping them achieve their goals.  Critical components to practicing 
Intentionality are the internal focus and deliberate monitoring of 
thoughts for assumptions and language choice, consciously choosing 
our communication profile in the full range of activities in working 
professionally with others, and deliberately reflecting.
  Thus, the concept of “internal monitoring” is 




 192. See Douglas J. Hacker, Definitions and Empirical Foundations, in METACOGNITION IN 
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (Douglas J. Hacker et al. eds. 1998); John 
Flavell, Metacognition Theory, THEORIES LEARNING EDUC. PSYCHOL., 
http://www.lifecircles-inc.com/Learningtheories/constructivism/flavell.html (last 
visited May 12, 2011); see also John H. Flavell, Metacognitive Aspects of Problem 
Solving, in THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE 231, 232 (Lauren Resnick ed., 1976); JOHN 
H. FLAVELL, THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF JEAN PIAGET 41 (1963); John H. 
Flavell, First Discussant's Comments: What Is Memory Development the 
Development of?, 14 HUM. DEV. 272, 277 (1971); John H. Flavell, Metacognition and 
Cognitive Monitoring: A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry, 34 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 906 (1979); John H. Flavell, Speculation About the Nature and 
Development of Metacognition, in METACOGNITION, MOTIVATION, AND 
UNDERSTANDING 21 (F. Weinert & R. Kluwe eds., 1987). 
  The 
 193. I evolved my “Intentionality” framework over many decades of study, practice, and 
internal reflections.  This framework is not novel thinking.  One can turn to multiple 
religious, spiritual, and philosophical doctrines and find a variety of contemplative 
models that contain similar orientations and practices.  Dr. Don Miguel Ruiz, a 
Mexican shaman, teaches a model containing similar steps to self-knowledge and how 
to reduce self-delusion.  See DON MIQUEL RUIZ & JANET MILLS, THE FOUR 
AGREEMENTS COMPANION BOOK 102 (2000).  What is novel is my perspective that 
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Intentionality framework provides a recursive, three-stage 
metacognitive process to successfully accomplish the goal of 
resisting default thinking. 
A.  Intentionality Framework 
Stage 1) Internal Intention to External Attention: 
This stage of forethought is the means for exercising control over 
one’s individual judgment through metacognition.  In other words, 
we focus our internal attention by looking at the quality of our 
reasoning.  We do this by testing our assessment by identifying both 
our emotions and our logic that we hear ourselves think internally.  
Of course, this requires developing the capacity to hear and indentify 
our emotional thoughts as well as our analytical thoughts.194  Thus, I 
emphasize the lawyer’s development of the ability to hear both their 
emotional thoughts as well as their reasoning.  In reality, this is how 
any self-correcting individual is able to check the accuracy of their 
understanding of meaning in any communication.195
Effective lawyers should be able to validate the content of their 
own emotional thoughts through vetting their attitudes and reactions.  
Thinking about both our emotional and analytical thinking makes us 
accountable for what we say and plan to do.  This is a deliberative 
stage where the lawyer focuses on critically listening to his or her 
thoughts.  The lawyer works with these thoughts to understand his or 
her own emotional content and to question the quality of his or her 
judgments. All of this forethought occurs prior to the stage of 
externalizing one’s attention to creating a plan.  In this first stage of 
forethought, the lawyer is focusing on developing his or her intention 
as a result of his or her internal focus. 
  The influence of 
the lawyer in all lawyering activity is so powerful that we must be 
able to routinely self-monitor how we are constructing meaning in 
order to achieve the desired outcomes in the specific matter. 
Metacognitive capacity reduces distortion in individual 
judgment.196
 
reflective self-awareness about the dynamics of human behavior should be integrated 
into legal problem-solving. 
  This capacity or internal reflection framework enables 
the individual to think about the quality of his or her thoughts and 
how that thinking impacts on his or her actions in the external 
 194. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 266–67. 
 195. See id. 
 196. See Anthony S. Niedwiecki, Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to 
Legal Education, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 33, 44–45 (2006). 
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world.197  To clarify, the lawyer examines the quality of his or her 
internal emotional and analytical reasoning.  Examples of this self-
aware internal focus include hearing our emotions and judgments in 
our reasoning, identifying what needs further inquiry, and testing our 
initial assessments.  This can be understood as a form of self-editing 
designed to accomplish the goal.  Once we have done the internal 
work, then we can effectively engage in the external attention and 
thereafter engage in both at the same time.  This internal intention 
guards against mindless reactions.198
Poor implementation of a good idea is often a worse consequence 
than no action at all.  Thus, using the Intentionality framework 
differentiates in the quality of the implementation of a good idea.  In 
this stage of forethought directed at our intention, the lawyer focuses 
on identifying the content of his or her reaction and surfaces his or 
her underlying concern that gives rise to the reaction.
  This stage of forethought on our 
internal monitoring explicitly acknowledges our reactions and our 
default thinking.  This forethought allows us the opportunity to 
modify our assessment before starting to implement our plan.  This 
improves the quality of any potential problem-solving that will occur.  
Paying attention to this stage of forethought in the formation of our 
intention can make the difference between a good idea implemented 
well and a good idea implemented poorly. 
199
Stage 2) External Attention to Action: 
  Surfacing 
his or her underlying concern, the lawyer is then in a position to 
choose to generate a plan that addresses the core concern.  This stage 
of deliberate forethought in examining our intention precedes the 
lawyer’s external attention and subsequent actions. 
In this second stage of the Intentionality framework, the lawyer is 
self-aware or self-monitoring of his or her intended content, tone, and 
delivery when communicating to others.  The lawyer successfully 
practices the second stage of Intentionality by simultaneously 
attending to both this internal agenda as well to the thought processes 
of the other individuals.  The practice of this second stage at any 
given point of external attention is a streaming process of back and 
forth attention and is thus recursive.  In other words, attention here is 
 
 197. See Hacker, supra note 192, at 10. 
 198. See Erika Summers-Effler, The Micro Potential for Social Change: Emotion, 
Consciousness, and Social Movement Formation, 20 SOC. THEORY 41, 50 (2002). 
 199. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 266. 
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an unending component of awareness in performance rather than one 
effort at one time.200
In this second stage of Intentionality, the lawyer deliberately pays 
attention to word choice, tone, and method of delivery.  The lawyer 
does so because of the importance of being as accurately understood 
and perceived as possible.  When the lawyer acknowledges the 
existence of default misunderstanding as explained earlier, the lawyer 
is more motivated to pay attention to one’s own delivery and 
language choice in carrying out all tasks in working with others.
 
201
Stage 3) Action to Reflection: 
 
The deliberate act of reflection allows the lawyer to identify what it 
is that he or she learned from the two stages of forethought to 
intention and paying external attention to action.  Reflecting on the 
quality of the first two stages of Intentionality informs and improves 
similar actions in the future.  Deliberate reflection provides the basis 
for making future choices that are more effective and less costly in 
accomplishing similar goals in the future. 
Reflection is not a mindless rationalization process for justifying 
performance.  Quite the opposite, reflection provides a way for the 
lawyer to know why choices were made and to draw lessons that will 
improve future performance.202
 
 200. See Mary Ellen Kondrat, Who Is the “Self” in Self-Aware: Professional Self-
Awareness from a Critical Theory Perspective, 73 SOC. SERV. REV. 451, 453–54 
(1999). 
  The ability to reflect is a cornerstone 
of Intentionality because it is the means by which the master 
practitioner is capable of learning how to avoid responding the same 
way in the future.  The ability to reflect on performance requires 
 201. See Blaustone, supra note 92, at 241–43 (discussing the perspective of the lawyer as 
one who professionally must effectively work with others in legal problem solving); 
see also Susan Bryant, Collaboration in Law Practice: A Satisfying and Productive 
Process for a Diverse Profession, 17 VT. L. REV. 459, 459–60 (1993) (discussing the 
lack of self-awareness in lawyers’ work styles when working collaboratively); see 
also Susan Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 
8 CLINICAL L. REV. 33, 56, 70–72 (2001) [hereinafter Bryant, Five Habits] (discussing 
“isomorphic attribution” and the lawyer’s intentional listening for connotations—how 
words and acts can have different meanings; also discussing the lawyer’s intentional 
thinking method of “Parallel Universes” to encourage alternative inferences in the 
assessment of accurate understanding of others). 
                I administer the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) psychological assessment to 
law students as a tool to increase self-awareness and to motivate law students to adopt 
my Intentionality framework in their professional practice. 
 202. Beryl Blaustone, Teaching Law Students to Self-Critique and to Develop Critical 
Clinical Self-Awareness in Performance, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 143, 159–60 (2006). 
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separation from judging one’s own motivation or character and is 
geared towards internal analysis of why difficulties occurred, and 
how to plan or strategize how to handle the tasks better next time.  
Thus, reflection should be a routine integrated component of thinking 
about the lawyer’s performance that assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the particular task.203  Reflection is a balanced 
assessment geared towards perpetual achievement of mastery in 
future lawyering.204
B. Potential Pitfalls: 
  Reflection is thus the last stage of Intentionality, 
which closes the circle and starts the next cycle in the Intentionality 
framework. 
A potential pitfall of practicing the Intentionality framework is that 
mastery can produce complacency.  One might ignore the usefulness 
of each stage of Intentionality as they begin to perform each stage by 
rote or automatically.  However, this tendency need not be a problem 
if users of the framework are aware of those situations in which it is 
necessary for them to examine their own intentional acts.  The 
benefits of integrating core concepts of brain function can be 
accomplished by the active use of this framework as one part of 
conscious-lawyering activity.  The imperative to choose to do so is 
reinforced by correcting our basic premises about human behavior. 
IV.  MODELING AND TEACHING INTENTIONALITY IN THE 
CLINICAL SUPERVISION CONTEXT. 
A. Modeling Stages One and Two of the Intentionality Framework. 
Effective clinical supervision requires supervisors to model habits 
of Intentionality in lawyering and in their supervision.  Effective 
supervision requires supervisors to intentionally focus internally on 
their combined emotional- and analytical-thinking processes and to 
observe the comprehension process of the law student (recipient 
other) in their understanding of meaning in communication. The 
effective practitioner of the Intentionality framework actively focuses 
on the internal intention to resist assumptions about what the other 
understands from the supervision encounter.  Thus both the clinical 
supervisor and the legal intern must deliberately devote attention to 
their communication processes, which yield either accurate 
comprehension or counterproductive misinterpretation.  The student 
 
 203. Id. at 159. 
 204. Id. at 159–60. 
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and the supervisor are perceiving, listening, watching, interpreting, 
applying metaphors, and sorting into categories—all of which yields 
internal meaning of the external communication.  This internal 
meaning sets the basis for indentifying the tasks, planning, exploring 
ambiguities, and selecting the appropriate responses.  This means 
attorney supervisors should bring the same high level of self-
awareness in communication with their legal interns that the attorney 
brings in deliberate language choice and deliberate actions with 




205. I have synthesized several principles of learning that are the theoretical rationale for 
the teaching of a reflective Intentionality framework to law students.  This article 
addresses two of these principles in text because they more directly reduce distortions 
from automatic default human behavior. Another three relevant principles can be 
found below: 
 focuses on the understanding of 
meaning rather than purely on the information exchange.  Often, 
           1.    Supervisor’s explicit commitment to student’s capacity. 
 The teacher or supervisor is explicitly reinforcing the law student’s sense of 
competence and responsibility.  This means the law teacher or supervisor explicitly 
tells the law student that they are capable of learning and performing the specific tasks 
assigned.  This message encourages the law student’s desire to do better—to do one’s 
best—and to strive for excellence in the provision of legal services.  Learning theory 
and scientific studies support the premise that explicit commitment to the student’s 
capacity incentivizes the learning process.  The act of being explicit about the 
student’s capacity and responsibility helps move the legal intern from the role of 
student to the role of novice attorney—bearing responsibility for the welfare of the 
client. 
2.   Supervisor’s explicit commitment to the joint responsibility for student learning. 
           This premise refers to the explicit contracting discussion between law student and 
supervisor or teacher about the assigned tasks, objective goals of the work, and 
specific learning goals for the student.  However, more is intended.  This premise also 
refers to the supervisor or teacher making the effort to explicitly communicate his or 
her commitment to shared responsibility for the student’s learning.  The act of doing 
so conveys to the law student that he or she is an active partner with the supervisor or 
teacher in the student’s goal of acquiring lawyering competency.  Implicitly, the 
student comprehends that he or she is not alone in the professional quest to become a 
competent lawyer.  This message also implicitly conveys to the student that he or she 
bears primary responsibility for actually transitioning to the role of competent lawyer, 
and, thus is expected to be proactively accountable for all activity in the assigned 
matter. 
3.    Self-generated observations promote learning & ownership. 
           The act of taking initiative in the reflection process generates more momentum by the 
student to take on more responsibility in conducting the assigned legal task.  Taking 
the lead in assessing their own performance of assigned tasks gives law students a 
sense of control and safety because they comprehend the actual professional learning 
goals of the assessment discussion or engagement with the supervisor.  Further, the 
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clinical supervisors incorrectly believe that information-giving is the 
same as generating a common understanding of meaning.  Further, 
supervisors may often assume that information-giving produces 
learning for the law student.  From this faulty premise comes the 
erroneous assumption that “if I tell you something then you will 
understand me the way I intend to be understood.”206
 
  As a 
countermeasure, practicing Intentionality means that the clinical 
supervisor must consciously foster shared meaning and actively resist 
the automatic human-behavior default shortcuts that generate more 
inaccuracies in the way we understand each other.  When we take 
charge of verifying the understanding of our meaning, we cease to be 
reactive victims of misunderstanding.  If we model this active 
engagement with our law students, we model a practice that embeds 
greater capacity in the law student to build more accurate common 
understanding of meaning in their future lawyering with the full 
range of individuals with whom they will be interacting. 
B.  Effective Teaching or Supervision Requires Constant Vigilance 
  by the Supervisor to Language Choice, Tone, and Delivery. 
  The Teacher or Supervisor Must Adopt an Approach of Inquiry 
  and Not Judgment. 
 
If we, as clinical supervisors, consistently listen and probe for the 
student’s meaning and thus actively shows the student we are present 
with them, we model the very skills they are trying to effectively 
practice in their lawyering activity.  We reduce predictable distortion 
by increasing our vigilance against premature and automatic 
judgments.  We reduce the amount of default assumptions in our 
understanding by taking the time to make explicit the potential 
assumptions operating by both the clinical supervisor and the legal 
intern.  This is accomplished by both the clinical supervisor and the 
legal intern asking questions of one another.  The clinical supervisor 
sets the tone that it is appropriate to be a rigorous fact investigator 
and therefore to routinely check his or her understanding of the 
communication occurring in the supervision relationship.  This 
 
students are less likely to subjectively experience themselves at the total mercy of a 
supervisor, who they may anticipate is judging both their capacity and their character.  
When the supervisor first engages with the students’ self-generated observations, the 
students are less likely to conclude that they are subject to the complete imposition of 
the supervisor’s assessment regardless of the law students’ points of view. 
 206. Bryant, Five Habits, supra note 201, at 52–55; see also Blaustone, supra note 202, at 
152. 
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proactive approach to actively increase common meaning will 
demonstrate to each participant how often there is inaccurate 
understanding.  Sometimes the inaccuracy will be minimal and 
sometimes the inaccuracy will be significant.  This process of 
checking in with each other and giving each other permission to ask 
questions and seek guidance will overtime contribute to the law 
student becoming more astute at figuring out when to consult and to 
monitor his or her level of accuracy in understanding meaning in the 
communication process.  Given that the human brain unconsciously 
overestimates the depth and accuracy of knowledge—even in the way 
we view a photograph—it makes sense to explicitly monitor what we 
consciously understand as a product of our shared communications.207
The supervisor is making hard choices not only in tone and 
delivery, but also of the substantive focus of reflection in order to 
effectively process the issues in performance.  We see the vast terrain 
of what the student misses and it is difficult to be highly selective of 
what is both essential in processing the legal work of the intern and to 
also focus on the student’s learning from the performance.  In this 
process it is quite certain that the supervisor finds it more difficult to 
see the vast terrain of what they are missing with the legal intern as 
well as in the legal case.  The supervisor needs to self-regulate for 
awareness of tone, delivery, and assumptions with the goal of keen 
attention or focus on what the law student is communicating by 
language and behavior.  The attention is to what is going on for the 
law student in the instant communication rather than on the quick 
judgment as supervisor as to what is happening with the student in 
the communication process. 
  
The supervisor’s attention to tone and delivery establishes a sense of 
safety for the student to start reflecting on his or her actual limitations 
in sharing joint meaning in professional lawyering practice. 
C.  Modeling and Structuring Normalizes the Reflection Process 
Reflection is not an accustomed exercise or habit of the novice 
attorney.  Modeling and structuring a reflection process—including a 
feedback process on performance—normalizes the reflection process 
as an integral part of the attorney’s professional attention to capable 
self-awareness.208
 
 207. Blaustone, supra note 202, at 152–53; see also Fragale & Heath, supra note 58, at 
226–27. 
  Reflection should be regarded as a regular, normal 
component of the supervision discussion and of the assessment of the 
 208. See generally Blaustone, supra note 202, at 159–60. 
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actions taken in a case.209  As such, the law student experiences it as a 
less risky encounter instead of being an unpleasant discussion, which 
only happens when problems arise in a specific circumstance.  
Modeling regular reflection that covers key productive and 
counterproductive aspects of the student’s performance as a normal 
component of how a lawyer thinks is modeling proactive professional 
self-correction.210
Modeling and structuring reflection produces explicit articulation 
of the expectations about this engagement.  Expectations become 
known and are not a surprise for the student.  The positive 
consequence is that there is less room for misinterpretation of the 
supervisor’s intent by the student.  Explicit expectations about 
debriefing performance and discussing expectations promote a sense 
of safety for the law student in their transition from student to novice 
attorney.
  This is a productive countermeasure to the 
common experience that reflection is simply a random afterthought 
that happens only at uncomfortable and spontaneous intervals.  
Lastly, when teachers or supervisors consistently model and provide 
structure for reflection, there is less likelihood that the teacher or 
supervisor’s input is full of subjective judgment made worse by the 
objective fact that the student perceives meaning through the actual 
framework of the power imbalance in the supervisor or teacher to 
student or intern relationship. 
211  A sense of safety does not mean that the student is 
protected from performance anxiety and the fears of failure and 
judgment.  It means that the student is flying with a safety net and 
that falling will not result in irreparable harm.  Transparency, or the 
intentional elevation from implicit to explicit meaning, is the thread 
that forms the safety net.  If this becomes the norm in the supervision, 
then the safety net becomes stronger and the student flies higher—
taking on a more professional role and accountability.  All of the 
above points suggest that before we ask students to engage in their 
reflection with us, it is fundamentally necessary for the teacher or 
supervisor to explicitly instruct on reflection and to model their own 
repetitive self-correction as a normal part of the master practitioner’s 
continual personal and professional growth.212
 
 209. Id. 
  This modeling yields 
the profound lesson for the law student of becoming more 
comfortable with uncertainty and complexity as familiar realities in 
 210. Blaustone, supra note 202, at 161–62. 
 211. Id. at 153–54, 162. 
 212. Id. at 161. 
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which lawyers are expected to successfully solve problems.213  
Perhaps this process will become less scary for the student because 
we regularly demonstrate that we experience both mistakes and 
achievements and greater abilities and misjudgments in the 
performance of our lawyering activities.  Success is the result of the 
fuller capacity to self-correct and to replicate our achievements as we 
move into our next assignments.214  Lastly, the law student benefits 
from the supervisor’s modeling of calm leadership in the urgent 
circumstances of legal representation.  The student repeatedly 
experiences that certain forms of reflection produce the capacity to 
remain calm and take effective measures in the unanticipated reality 
of the present performance.215
Intensive repetition of reflective practice allows the student to 





  Repetition anchors or embeds the learning.  The law 
student experiences the repeated process that self-learning is a big 
part of being a lawyer.  The teacher or supervisor devotes time to 
repeating reflection skills with the student because random attention 
to reflection and assessment does not establish routine capacity or 
habit.  This opportunity to practice repetition of reflection skills 
creates the possibility of the student achieving mastery in the use of 
the Intentionality framework. 
Human beings should understand themselves better as self-
regulating, thinking actors who are able to deliberately take into 
account the functioning defaults inherent in our thinking processes.217
 
 213. Id. at 155, 162. 
  
To do this, we must cultivate self-awareness and constantly monitor 
our thought process to ensure accurate understanding and to guard 
against erroneous default behavior or construction of meaning.  By 
listening critically to our thoughts and hearing our emotions and 
judgments in our reasoning, we are better able to identify what needs 
further inquiry and to test our initial assessments.  We are also better 
able to self-monitor and construct accurate shared meaning when 
communicating with others; through the process of reflection, we 
continually build on our capacity to achieve these goals.  By 
 214. See id. at 159. 
 215. See id. at 152–53, 155. 
 216. Id. at 159. 
 217. Hacker, supra note 192, at 10 (citing R.H. Kluwe, Cognitive Knowledge and 
Executive Control: Metacognition, in ANIMAL MIND—HUMAN MIND 222 (D.R. Griffin 
ed., 1982)). 
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understanding human behavior and adopting the Intentionality 
framework, law teachers will have a better understanding of how 
students learn, and can teach students how to more effectively 
practice. 
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